Beside-the-mind: an unsettling, reparative reading of paranoia by Liebert, R. & Liebert, R.
BESIDE-THE-MIND 
Beside-the-mind: An unsettling, reparative reading of paranoia 
Having undertaken a critical analysis of a transnational program of research to identify and 
intervene on the prodrome, a pre-psychotic state, here I experiment with an unsettling, reparative 
reading of its affective coils – paranoia. Etymologically joining para (beside) with nous (mind), 
“paranoia” denotes an experience beside-the-mind. I attempt to follow these roots, meeting a 
non-human figure – Coatlicue – as introduced through Chicana philosopher and poet, Gloria 
Anzaldúa. In the arms of this goddess, the prodrome points to the vitality and the milieu of 
paranoia, re-turning it as a capacity, calling for modes of attunement and apprenticeship, and 
perhaps protecting our psychological and political practices against yet another operation of 
colonialist capture. Challenging the subject, interlocutors, and form typically adopted by not just 
Psychology but Affect Studies too, I hope in this performative essay to also lift up the problems 
and possibilities of “border thinking” as a means to open the potential decoloniality, and thus 
response-ability, of these fields within the present political moment. 
 




Come, little green snake. Let the wound caused by the serpent be cured by the serpent. 
(Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 68) 
 
Unsettling 
Since the turn of the century, Western scholarship has been giving increasing attention to the 
circulation of paranoia within its cultural milieu. Like Dave Harper (2008), in this essay I want to 
challenge the conceptual resources that are usually invited to understand this circulation. For 
him, the problem lies in a binary structuring the scholarship: effectively, paranoia is depicted as 
either coming from ‘the inside’ or ‘the outside’, from the individual or society. While initially 
offering discursive analyses as a means to trouble this divide, Harper later joins with John 
Cromby to do so via embodied analyses (Cromby & Harper, 2012), thereby also joining a slow 
turn to affect within Psychology. Continuing this trajectory, I wonder if we might further 
conceive of paranoia as what Lisa Blackman (2012) calls “threshold phenomena” – those that 
“suggest some kind of transport between the self and other, inside and outside, and material and 
immaterial” (p. 20). Drawing on Karen Barad (2007), by “phenomenon” Blackman (2010) 
signals that these experiences are not pre-existing entities, discoverable through measurement, so 
much as emerging through the intra-action of a variety of entangled agencies. This relational 
ontology allows voice-hearing, telepathy, and (perhaps, as I shall sketch) paranoia, to question 
the individual subject of Psychology, opening up a more “trans-subjective sense of the psychic or 
psychological as a shared, collective encounter or event” (p. 11-12).  
Importantly, when taking this trans-subjective stance, Blackman (2014) rejects 
temptations to designate ‘the affective turn’ – and the ontologies it invites – as in some way 
‘new’. For such not only assumes a shift from one episteme to another, thereby “reproducing the 
very progressivist and linear narratives that have been reworked over and over in our critical 
thinking” (p. 2), but ignores the continuation of discontinuities, of that which is “transmitted 
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through silences, gaps, omissions, echoes, and murmurs” (p. 2). In turn, Blackman (2010, 2012, 
2014) tunes into nineteenth century tales of Western psychological experimentation to hear from 
threshold phenomena. I have also been called by discontinuities, however my listening has taken 
a different direction; one that is in part inspired by Steve Brown and Paul Stenner’s (2009) 
introduction to their recent book. Likewise dedicated to reimagining models of subjectivity in 
Psychology through an assembling of alternative theoretical resources, Brown and Stenner use 
the story of Moby Dick to push Psychology away from taking an ‘Ahab-function’ that aims to 
“find and have done with the whale” and toward an ‘Ishmael-function’ that aims instead to 
“follow the whale, wherever it takes us, endlessly” (p. 5). The ‘whale’, in this case, being the 
psyche; one that is otherwise hunted, captured, killed by our Western psychological trappings. 
To prepare for this Ishmael-function, Brown and Stenner draw on six “key thinkers” (Luhmann, 
Artaud, Spinoza, Bergson, Foucault, Deleuze), with Whitehead and Serres as overall guides; a 
tactic that comes with a somewhat surprising acknowledgment: 
We are uncomfortably aware of the fact that our thinkers are all white, European males… 
This selection rather obviously reflects our peculiar intellectual paths and our particular 
interests and desires. Equally obviously it should not be taken as suggesting that these are 
the only thinkers worth engaging with… (p. 6-7) 
 
In her phenomenology of whiteness, Sara Ahmed (2007) documents how discomfort 
signals a usual comfort, of being “so at ease with one’s environment that it is hard to distinguish 
where one’s body ends and the world begins” (p. 158). This environment is one that is ‘white’ – 
ready for certain kinds of bodies, perpetually shaped by their habits, and inherited from 
colonization; Brown and Stenner’s discomfort echoes with another connection between 
Psychology and whaling. Pursuing not just any whale but a prized white one embroiled in the 
currents of nineteenth century capitalist expansion, Moby Dick isn’t simply “an exemplary 
demonstration of human endeavor” (p. 1, my emphasis), it is a colonial one. With this 
 3 
BESIDE-THE-MIND 
soundscape their intellectual path does not seem so peculiar, nor does it seem so obvious that 
non-white, -European -male thinkers are worthy of engagement. Especially given that 
predominantly thinking with white, European males appears to remain the norm if not the 
demand when taking an affective turn – despite over a decade of critique of these knowledge 
practices for doing so (e.g., Hemmings, 2005). Not only does this prolong an erroneous sense of 
newness within such scholarship (Khoo, 2015), it both presumes and erases settler colonial 
epistemologies, “unwittingly reifying the normatively White Enlightenment subject, and the 
settler colonial grounds on which it is formed” (Rowe & Tuck, 2016, p. 5). To habitually cite the 
thought of white, European males contributes to the epistemologies of ignorance (Alcoff, 2007) 
haunting both Psychology and Affect Studies – productions that have been crucial to the ascent 
of whiteness (Mills, 2007).  
It might seem crude to ‘bring this up, again’, but its important to not rest easy with our 
knowledge that colonization was, as Aime Cesaire (1955) first described, a violent hypocrisy of 
barbaric ‘civilization’. Instead, Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers (2011) recommend that 
we feel the fright that such an acknowledgment may arouse1. That is, “that it is not so easy to 
stop taking ourselves for the brains of humanity, and that with all the best intentions in the world, 
we may well continue to do so” (p. 63). Indeed, for Pignarre and Stengers, naming colonization 
can arouse a fright that invites us to pause and look more closely at what holds us, to see the 
notion that ‘we know’ as a ‘we must’ or a ‘we are obliged to’. Whether implied or enforced, an 
insistence that we predominantly draw on the categorical figures of the affective turn may thus 
be protecting us from recognizing the fallacy that to think is to be the West. This protection is 
particularly germane when studying the psyche, whereby “we have a psychiatrist, a 
psychoanalyst, an ethnographer feeling at home everywhere he (or she) goes”, translating 
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experiences into “ready-made theoretical tokens” (Nathan, 1999, n.p). To not do this, Tobie 
Nathan (1999) continues, is to partake in projects of not just theoretical but political 
experimentation, addressing as it would the question of the place we attribute to ‘otherworldly’ 
thought systems. Indeed, to recognizing that other worlds are possible. Brown and Stenner’s 
(2009) discomfort, then, offers a generous, generative site for those of us who, like them, yearn 
for a more responsive Psychology in these contemporary times of urgency and unrest. 
Times that themselves ‘bring this up, again’. The past year has witnessed the increasing 
visibility of fascist rhetoric and movements in the global North – whether the rise of the far 
Right, militarized police, xenophobia, or a violent and ignorant whiteness. With it, the affects, 
discourses, and tactics of colonization become louder; a repetition of the past, albeit with a 
different tone (Cesaire, 1955). A decolonial orientation becomes all the more relevant – if not 
necessary (Maldonado-Torres, 2006; Stewart-Harawira, 2005) – for thinking through 
Psychology’s ability to respond, our response-ability in this political moment. To do so is to join 
somewhat with recent postcolonial contributions to Subjectivity (e.g. Frosh, 2016; Hook, 2013; 
Truscott, 2016), whose analyses reveal what remains “implicitly present” in work that follows 
European genealogies of subjectivity (Blackman et al., 2008). However, if this presence answers 
to “colonization” it may also be revealed in postcolonial authors’ own use of universalizing 
psychoanalytic concepts (Gunew, 2009). Thus, in this essay I experiment with an unsettling 
reading of paranoia as a threshold phenomenon, troubling an additional binary. Hamid Dabashi 
and Walter Mignolo (2015) write how the condition of coloniality that has made one unable to 
think has also made the other, locked into their worldview, unable to read a changing world. Like 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2006), they thus recommend that we choose interlocutors who do not 
perpetuate ‘the West’ as better thinkers than ‘the rest’, purposefully breaking the habits of 
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institutional whiteness (Ahmed, 2007) and thus settler-colonialism (Smith, 2012). With practice, 
such dialogue may open us to readings that lie beside a colonial episteme, a kind of “border 
thinking” that aims to “change the terms, not just the content of the conversation” (Mignolo, 
2012, p. 69-70). 
Here, then, I shall sketch paranoia by staging an encounter between supposedly opposite 
interlocutors – not just non-European and European, but also non-human and human – not to 
assimilate the formers into the latters but to disrupt the dichotomy by being the dichotomy, 
“thinking from dichotomous concepts rather than ordering the world in dichotomies” (Mignolo, 
2012, p. 85). To poke at their borders, to make things stir. A flagrantly lively affair, this ‘re-turn’ 
is not a romantic application of a dead past onto a dead present so much as a spiraling around of 
earlier thought to create something else here-now, breathing new life into paranoia (Barad, 
2014). My overarching hope is to lift up the de/colonial potential of threshold phenomena and, 
therefore, the de/colonial potential of taking an affective turn in Psychology2.  
 
Reparative 
While typically addressed as a “conspiracy culture” (Harper, 2008) or “surveillance society” 
(Frosh, 2016) awash with street cameras, e/mail snooping, data storage, and government secrets, 
this depiction of our Western paranoid milieu does not attend to the state stalking, attacking, and 
murdering of brown and black bodies simultaneously happening under the same regime. 
Paranoia is circulating within a post-9/11 context that explicitly incants suspicion for both the 
making of ‘good’ citizens and the quarantining, if not exterminating, of ‘bad’ ones (Puar & Rai, 
2002). Keeping these politics of terror nearby obliges an analysis that involves race, capital, and 
nation, including how experiences of paranoia are happening in lives lived on or off stolen 
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Indigenous land, thereby interrupting the “universalized subject of emotion, unmarked by 
geography or even social location—and ‘innocent’ of any complicity to settlement” otherwise 
lurking in affect studies (Rowe & Tuck, 2016, p. 6). Ghassan Hage (2003), for example, 
documents a paranoiac colonial sensibility in settler colonies that is based on a fear of losing, or 
never attaining, the superiority promised by whiteness; one that was enflamed by 9/11. Similarly, 
Sanjay Sharma & Ashwani Sharma (2003) and Ashwani Sharma (2009) document how 9/11 
transgressed colonial boundaries between the West and the rest, threatening the universality of 
whiteness, producing a paranoid subjectivity. The increasing circulation of paranoia is thus 
considered directly related to the West’s geopolitical precarity; notably an idea that echoes in 
responses to the recent election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the US. Situated in this 
political context, elsewhere I too have offered an image of paranoia as a dis-ease of white 
supremacy, one that can be traced through colonization whereby a desire-to-know entangles with 
a fear of ‘regressing’. However, colonization requires ignorance (of colonial violence, of 
Indigenous capacities), meaning such paranoia may be a threat to colonial projects; psycurity is 
the name that I gave to the force that organizes these unnerving coils. Directing paranoia to hide 
as reasonable suspicion, predict the future, brand threatening bodies, and grow through fear, 
psycurity assemblages channel paranoia in ways that animate a neocolonial security state 
(Author, 2016; forthcoming).  
This project emerged out of my ethnography of the self-proclaimed prodromal 
‘revolution’ – a transnational program of research and “radical reform” (McGorry, 2015) to 
identify and intervene on young people who may become psychotic, including being 
pathologically paranoid, in order to “save lives, restore and safeguard futures, and strengthen the 
global economy” (p. 310). While initial talk of an identifiable pre-psychotic phase can be traced 
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to the beginning of the twentieth century, it was at the turn of the twenty-first century that there 
was a “strong resurgent interest” in this idea (Woods, Miller, McGlashan, 2001), with a 100-fold 
“explosion” in pre-psychotic research between 1991 and 2011 (Fusar-Poli et al., 2013). 
Catalyzed by a 1999 program announcement from the US National Institute of Mental Health, 
this explosive interest was led by the North American Prodrome Longitudinal Study (NAPLS) – 
a multisite project explicitly aiming to generate the largest and most powerful prodromal sample 
in the world (Addington et al., 2015). This global mission gained fuel in December 2012 when a 
shooting at Sandy Hook elementary school in the white middle-class suburb of Connecticut 
triggered large-scale federal investment to identify and intervene on ‘early warning signs’ of 
madness. Described on National Public Radio as, “to schools like 9/11 was to airports,” the 
Sandy Hook shooting led to public pleas that, as Dr. Oz on CNN’s Piers Morgan Tonight Show 
put it at the time, “We need a Homeland Security approach to mental illness”.  
My analysis considered how, driven by its own paranoia, this nascent, contested, and 
accelerating prodromal “movement” (Candilis, 2003) animates a neocolonial security state. 
However, I have since come to wonder if there might be more to this psycurity assemblage than 
met my critical eye. Michel Foucault (1983) argues that the concept of assemblage offers a 
number of principles for “the art of living counter to all forms of fascism” (p. xiii, my emphasis). 
The first of these principles is, “Free political action from all unifying and totalizing paranoia” 
(p. xiii). Albeit explicitly witnessing paranoia’s stifling effects, Foucault’s adjectives imply that 
there may be more than one kind of paranoia, one that is neither unifying nor totalizing. And, 
moreover, that this potential may come from psycurity assemblages themselves; his sentence 
structure hints at Eve Sedgwick’s (2003) “unintentionally stultifying side effect” of critical 
scholarship – the privileging of paranoia. Drawing on Melanie Klein, Sedgwick sees paranoia as 
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a relational stance that works to anticipate, generalize, and expose in order to avoid surprises and 
humiliation, and thus the affective drive of scholarship that seeks to do the same. And yet, “for 
someone to have an unmystified view of systemic oppressions does not intrinsically or 
necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences” 
(p. 127, her emphasis). To the contrary, paranoia has a mode of selective scanning and a 
mushrooming, self-confirming strength that “circumscribes its potential as a medium of political 
or cultural struggle” (p. 130). Concerned that these days, “to theorize out of anything but a 
paranoid critical stance has come to seem naïve, pious, or complaisant” (p. 125), Sedgwick thus 
calls for positioning paranoid readings as not a mandatory injunction but a possibility among 
other possibilities.  
Resonating with decolonial warnings about an epistemic violence that strips away 
diversity and agency (Mohanty, 2003; Spivak, 1988), Sedgwick’s analysis gifts another kind of 
response-ability for the affects-cum-effects of Psychology in the present political moment. As 
opposed to the ‘strong theory’ of paranoid readings, so weighty it can't be moved, she suggests 
experimenting with ‘weak theory’, with making multiple, localized, unstable knowledges that – 
welcoming surprise and organized with hope – do justice to a wide affective range. Thus, in this 
essay I re-enter the prodromal movement to experiment with a reparative reading of paranoia 
itself, looking for a “space of disjunct” within the coils of psycurity (McManus, 2011). 
Etymologically joining para (beside) with nous (mind), ‘paranoia’ denotes an experience beside-
the-mind. I attempt to follow these roots, to meet their non-human figure (Miller, 1977), as 
introduced through Chicana philosopher and poet, Gloria Anzaldúa (1987)3 – seeing if a cause of 





If you can tell me all on your own that its not real, it's a four. If I need to throw you a line 
that it might be a part of your imagination, it's a five. 
 
I jotted down this quote on December 9th, 2014, when I was sitting around a table with seven 
other people in a very small, very hot room in the basement of a mental health hospital on the 
East Coast of the US. We were participating in a one-day Rater Training Workshop to learn how 
to use the Structured Interview for Psychosis Risk Syndromes, or SIPS – an instrument designed 
to capture the abovementioned prodrome. Usually two days long, I was invited to this one-off 
one-day SIPS training after it was pulled together by special request for three participants from 
Santiago who had been funded by the Chilean government to establish the first prodromal clinic 
in their country. They bought a gift (chocolate, I think), thrilled for the opportunity to be trained 
by our trainer – a clinician and research director at the center of this increasingly global 
enterprise. Designed to “define, diagnose, and measure change systematically in individuals who 
may be in a pre-psychotic state” (Miller et al, 1999, p. 275), the SIPS originated to support a 
double blind clinical trial on the ability of anti-psychotic drugs to prevent psychosis and, now 
used by NAPLS, has since become pivotal to the worldwide movement for the collection of 
prospective data on the prodrome. 
And so, over seven hours of rapid-fire training we were shown how the SIPS – woven 
together with nearly 40 pages of questions – throws its think-net over ‘unusual thought content’, 
‘suspiciousness’, ‘grandiose ideas’, ‘perceptual abnormalities’ and ‘disorganized 
communication’. Collectively called ‘attenuated psychotic symptoms’, these experiences are 
illustrated by Tandy Miller and colleagues’ with the following: 
Patients experiencing such symptoms can report hearing odd noises, such as banging or 
clicking or ringing; dogs barking when there is no animal present; or their name being 
called when no one has called them. More severe but still attenuated symptoms have been 
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described as hearing sounds or voices that seem far away or mumbled. People also report 
experiencing vague perceptual changes such as seeing colors differently, seeing flashes of 
light, or seeing geometric shapes. People have also frequently reported seeing shadows 
out of the corner of their eyes or vague ghostlike figures (p. 706). 
 
The SIPS extracts these kind of experiences with a battery of yes/no questions and allocates a 
rating between zero and six – zero meaning the symptom is “absent”, six meaning it is “floridly 
psychotic”, and three, four, or five meaning that it is “at-risk”, that the young person 
experiencing it is prodromal. During the training we were offered a “cheat sheet” to differentiate 
between these seven scores – the difference that mattered most was that between five and six, 
that gate between prodromal and psychotic, potential and actual. This rating hinged “most 
importantly” on whether or not someone could “self-disclose their doubt”. If they could not – if 
you “let people talk and talk and talk” about their experience and they “never say its not real” – 
then they cross the border into madness.  
Except that we were taught another, unofficial, “trick”. Conceptualizing an individual as 
at this point “hanging over a cliff”, our trainer directed us to “throw them a line” by asking a 
question: “Did you ever consider the possibility that this was part of your imagination?” If the 
young person “grabs the line” – saying “Yes” to this question – we are to give them a five; if 
they don’t grab the line – saying “No, it was real” or “It felt real” – we are to give them a six, 
watching as they tumble over the edge into Psychotic Disorder. Curled through with what Alfred 
North Whitehead (1920) named the “bifurcation of nature”, this trick presumes that perception is 
divided into two sets of things, effectively: ‘nature’ + ‘psychic additions’: 
For example, what is given in perception is the green grass. This is an object which we 
know as an ingredient in nature. The theory of psychic additions would treat the 
greenness as a psychic addition furnished by the perceiving mind, and would leave to 
nature merely the molecules and the radiant energy which influence the mind towards 
that perception. (p. 29) 
 
  The SIPS patrols for those psychic additions gone awry. Developed through a review of 
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existing retrospective and prospective assessments of pre-psychosis, it is the descendant of an 
influential manual of perceptual disturbances in college students who were “probably at high-risk 
for psychosis” as per their responses to true/false tests of “traits of the schizophrenia prone” 
(Chapman & Chapman, 1980, p. 48). One such scale was the Perceptual Aberration scale 
(Chapman et al, 1978), based on a psychoanalytic conceptualization of schizophrenia as 
ultimately being disturbances in one’s ability to establish and maintain boundaries – particularly 
those relating to the body (Item 1: “Sometimes I have had the feeling that I am united with an 
object near me”). Through a series of interviews with these students, Chapman and Chapman 
(1980) organized 80 types of “deviant” experiences into six categories of symptoms, becoming 
the first to put forth an argument for, and manual of, “attenuated psychosis”. Large disclaimer 
included: 
We believe that the rating values given in this scale are suitable for most white persons 
from the United States and the general Western cultural tradition. We do not know if 
these values are suitable for blacks or for members of other minority subcultures. (p. 479) 
 
This concession of cross-cultural invalidity has carried through the prodromal field. The same 
research group went on to develop a series of individual scales based on this manual to identify 
“psychosis-prone” young adults. One such scale is Magical Ideation (Item 19: “I have sometimes 
sensed an evil presence around me, although I could not see it”), or the “belief, quasi-belief, or 
semi-serious entertainment of the possibility that events which, according to the causal concepts 
of this culture, cannot have a causal relation with each other, might somehow nevertheless do so” 
(Meehl, 1964, p. 54, as cited in Eckblad and Chapman, 1983, my emphasis). Left unnamed, the 
“this” of this definition floats quietly by, at once ignoring and incising a familiar standard: “the 
general Western cultural tradition”. As with their previous work, these authors emphasize that it 
is not what people experience so much as how they interpret them that requires assessment. What 
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matters is their degree of conviction that something ‘really’ happened. The idea that people 
might accurately be sensing these seemingly impossible bodily and causal relations appears to 
not even warrant a passing thought.  
The SIPS, then, has inherited an (award-winning4) legacy that separates the act of 
perceiving from that which is perceived, enabling the former to be assessed, judged, fixed. 
Whitehead ultimately responds to this birfurcation of nature by invoking his own “strange God” 
(Latour, 2011; Stengers, 2011); in the remainder of this essay I likewise respond. But by thinking 
with a different strange god(dess). 
 
Coatlicue5 
It is her reluctance to cross over, to make a hole on the fence and walk across, to cross the 
river, to take that flying leap into the dark, that drives her to escape, that forces her into 
the fecund cave of her imagination where she is cradled in the arms of Coatlicue, who 
will never let her go. If she doesn’t change her ways, she will remain a stone forever. No 
hay mas que cambiar. (p. 71) 
 
Here, Anzaldúa (1987) invokes Coatlicue, the earliest of the Mexica fertility and Earth 
goddesses. Known also as the Lady of the Serpent Skirt, ‘Coatlicue’ comes from coatl, the 
Nahuatl word for serpent, the most notable symbol for pre-Columbian America, associated with 
the womb “from which all things were born and to which all things returned” (p. 56). Indeed, 
with coatl also meaning twin, Coatlicue represents duality, its synthesis, and something more:  
After each of my four bouts with death I’d catch glimpses of an otherworld Serpent. 
Once, in my bedroom, I saw a cobra the size of the room, her hood expanding over me. 
When I blinked she was gone. I realized she was, in my psyche, the mental picture and 
symbol of the instinctual in its collective impersonal, pre-human. She, the symbol of the 
dark sexual drive, the chthonic (underworld), the feminine, the serpentine movement of 




For Anzaldúa, this “instinctual in its collective impersonal, pre-human” is a conflicted desire – a 
creative “fusion of opposites” (p. 69), an ancient fleshed knowing emerging from a painful 
assimilation to being animal: 
Snakes, viboras: since that day I’ve sought and shunned them. Always when they cross 
my path, fear and elation flood my body. I know things older than Freud, older than 
gender. She – that’s how I think of la Vibora, Snake Woman. Like the ancient Olmec, I 
know Earth is a coiled Serpent. Forty years it’s taken me to enter into the Serpent, to 
acknowledge that I have a body, that I am a body and to assimilate the animal body, the 
animal soul. (p. 48) 
 
Containing and balancing the dualities of male and female, light and dark, life and death, 
Anzaldúa documents how Coatlicue was divided, darkened, and disempowered through 
colonization. Pushed underground, this burying of “balanced oppositions” fertilized the growth 
of a militaristic, bureaucratic, predatory state (a description with haunting familiarity in the 
present-day US). 
And yet to be buried is to be planted. An entrance into the Serpent, into living with 
Coatlicue, brings forth ‘la facultad’, a “capacity to see in surface phenomena the meaning of 
deeper realities”: 
It is an instant “sensing”, a quick perception arrived at without conscious reasoning. It is 
an acute awareness mediated by the part of the psyche that does not speak, that 
communicates in images and symbols which are the faces of feelings, that is, behind 
which feelings reside/hide. The one possessing this sensitivity is excruciatingly alive to 
the world. (p. 60) 
 
“Latent in all of us”, la facultad takes shape under pressure and from the margins; more highly 
tuned within people who do not feel psychologically or physically safe – “the females, the 
homosexuals of all races, the darkskinned, the outcast, the persecuted, the marginalized, the 
foreign” (p. 60). A “kind of survival tactic that people, caught between worlds, unknowingly 
cultivate” (p. 61), la facultad is how one listens to and heeds the world.  
I walk into a house and I know whether it is empty or occupied. I feel the lingering 
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charge in the air of a recent fight or love-making or depression. I sense the emotions 
someone near is emitting – whether friendly or threatening. Hate and fear – the more 
intense the emotion, the greater my reception of it. I feel a tingling on my skin when 
someone is staring at me or thinking about me. I can tell how others feel by the way they 
smell, where others are by the air pressure on my skin. I can spot the love or greed or 
generosity lodged in the tissues of another. Often I sense the direction of and my distance 
from people or objects – in the dark, or with my eyes closed, without looking. It must be 
a vestige of a proximity sense, a sixth sense that’s lain dormant from long-ago times (p. 
61) 
 
I am struck by the resemblance between Anzaldúa’s description of la facultad and Miller 
and colleagues’ (1999) description above of attenuated psychotic symptoms, the assumed 
precursors of pathological paranoia. The former seen as a capacity, the latter as a deficit, their 
phenomenological overlap points to the ways that we in the sciences can camp on our examples, 
staking a territory (Stengers, 2011). For Stengers (2011) this is a trap. Empirical projects would 
better demonstrate ‘adequacy’ by not invoking anything that will allow an element of experience 
to be “eliminated, forgotten, treated as an exception or disqualified”, and ‘applicability’ by 
“demanding that some elements lend themselves to an ‘imaginative leap’” (p. 246). For 
prodromal research to be a Stengersian success, then, it must be put into conversation with those 
voices typically not allowed through psycurity, those that one might encounter outside the gates. 
Coatlicue is one such voice. An encounter that involves choosing not to grab the line offered by 
the SIPS, jumping off the cliff and into believing that attenuated psychotic symptoms are real, 




In attending to this first darkness I am led back to the mystery of the Origin. The one who 
watches, the one who whispers in a slither of serpents. Something is trying to tell me. 
That voice at the edge of things. But I know what I want and I stamp ahead, arrogance 
edging my face. I tremble before the animal, the alien, the sub- or supra-human, the me 
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that has something in common with the wind and the trees and the rocks, that possess a 
demon determination and ruthlessness beyond human. (p. 72) 
 
Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue, “the one who watches, the one who whispers in a slither of serpents”, 
moves through Stengers’ (2011) thinking with Whitehead about experience: 
There are other elements in our experience, on the fringe of consciousness, and yet 
massively qualifying our experience. In regard to these other facts, it is our consciousness 
that flickers, not the facts themselves. They are always securely there, barely 
discriminated, and yet inescapable. (p. 349)7 
 
Enacting one of Whitehead’s ontological principles that “There is nothing which floats into this 
world from nowhere” (p. 262)8, these “barely discriminated, and yet inescapable” facts are 
central to his philosophy of ‘prehension’ – an underlying activity marking the universal way that 
experience participates in the world. Loosely meaning ‘taking into account’, a prehensive event 
can be thought of as a unifying grasp, a gathering of unknown things into a togetherness that can 
then be known, a “what I will say ‘is’” (p. 297). This unification in turn becomes public, 
available for objectivation, making it "an ingredient for new becomings” (p. 297). 
Prehension thus makes “the operation and the production of reality coincide” (p. 147). 
Yet this does not mean that things “owe their reality to that perception” (p. 146). Rather, as 
Whitehead writes/Stengers cites, prehension “is the perspective of the castle over there from the 
standpoint of the unification here” (p. 148)9. Experience, then, is a mode of articulation, 
testifying to “what is other than it, about other places and other times” (p. 147). It follows that,  
If I feel something, this thing certainly enters into the definition of my experience: it 
belongs to my experience, and it is not forged by my experience. I sense it insofar as it 
testifies to something else. I produce myself qua feeling that which is not me. (p. 295)  
 
This articulation does not require a subject or cognitive process – any thing can prehend any 
thing. Indeed, prehension was coined to exhibit, “the common feature of all situations in which 
something makes a difference to something else, including the least ‘psychological’ ones” (p. 
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147). In doing so Whitehead takes experience beyond the human, filling a gap in Western 
thought long taunted by Coatlicue, by Anzaldúa’s “me that has something in common with the 
wind and the trees and the rocks”, that unsettles any idea of individuals that are separate from 
each other and all else that makes up the world. Further, as a process, prehension also witnesses 
the elements that an actual entity has denied in order to become – a negative prehension that is 
not exclusion so much as “indistinction, or reduction to insignificant noise” (p. 304). That “voice 
at the edge of things”, that flicker. Dormant but not extinct, these whispering potentialities are 
what Whitehead calls the scars of our feelings:  
A feeling bears on itself the scars of its birth; it recollects as a subjective emotion its 
struggle for existence; it retains the impress of what it might have been, but is not. It is 
for this reason that what an actual entity has avoided as a datum for feeling may yet be an 
important part of its equipment. The actual cannot be reduced to mere matter of fact in 
divorce from the potential. (p. 309)10 
 
The ‘unknown’, then, what could have been, is an important part of ‘knowing’, of what 
is. Whiteheadian philosophy is doing something similar to Anzaldúa, who “pokes a hole in the 
colonizer’s story of how darkness is the other of light, how it sits on the not-light side of the 
darkness/light binary, about how this story figures darkness as absence, lack, negativity” (Barad, 
2014, p. 171). Symbolizing the fertility of the contradictory, Anzaldúa’s invocation of Coatlicue 
shows us this potential in the actual, this imagination in the real. In the arms of this strange 
goddess, the prodrome no longer faces a cliff-edge so much as a borderland:  
Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish us from 
them. A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A borderland is a 
vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural 
boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its 
inhabitants. (p. 25) 
 
Unsettled, unrealized, unwanted, prodrome-the-borderland is first and foremost a space of 
potential, an emotional residue from negative prehension, wedged between ‘normal’ and 
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‘psychotic’. Patrolling these borders, the abovementioned SIPS seeks and surveils our 
experiences as they inhabit this in-between space.  
Anzaldúa inscribes borderland inhabitants with ‘la mestiza consciousness’, a psychic 
restlessness caused by the coming together of “habitually incompatible frames of reference”, 
creating “a struggle of the flesh, a struggle of borders, an inner war” (p. 100). For Barad (2014), 
the subsequent underground work, performed by the soul, is a form of diffraction such that, 
“there is no moving beyond, no leaving the ‘old’ behind. There is no absolute boundary between 
here-now and there-then. There is nothing that is new; there is nothing that is not new” (p. 168). 
As a borderland with no clear dividing lines, just “traces of what might yet (have) happen(ed)” 
(p. 168), the prodrome is a place where elements are gathering, undetermined as to which will 
become datum and which will be denied. A hot mess of prehension, it is a lively substrate 
activity radiating a spectrum of possibilities, where “each bit of matter, each moment of time, 
each position in space is a multiplicity, a superposition/entanglement of (seemingly) disparate 
parts” (p. 176).  
For Whitehead, such multiplicity is the stuff of cosmology. For Anzaldúa, such 
cosmology is the stuff of Coatlicue, that “consuming internal whirlwind, the symbol of the 
underground aspects of the psyche”: 
Coatlicue is the mountain, the Earth Mother who conceived all celestial beings out of her 
cavernous womb. Goddess of birth and death, Coatlicue gives and takes away life; she is 
the incarnation of cosmic process. (Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 68) 
 
Coatlicue, she who eats the sun and spits out the moon, who makes a circle by eating her own 
tail, enacts a discontinuous continuity, destroying to create; an eternal possibility emerging from 
the cracks, alive with those ancient non-known elements of knowing that always have the 
potential to unite with something else, to make something else, to annihilate something else. 
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Coatlicue, the borderland goddess, stands with la mestiza, the borderland psyche, as she 
participates in, 
the creation of yet another culture, a new story to explain the world and our participation 
in it, a new value system with images and symbols that connect us to each other and to 
the planet. Soy un amasamiento, I am an act of kneading, of uniting and joining that not 
only has produced both a creature of darkness and a creature of light, but also a creature 
that questions the definitions of light and dark and gives them new meanings. (p. 103) 
 
Prodrome-the-borderland, then, implies an Anzaldúaian place of alchemical happenings, 
transmuting the prodromal movement into a site of “(r)evolution” (Anzaldúa, 1987) (not 
revolution [cf. McGorry, 2015]). In turn this diffracting terrain beckons attention to “its unique 
material historialities and how they come to matter” (Barad, 2014, p. 176). For Stengers (2011), 
this mattering depends on the milieu; prehensive events oblige particular milieu in order for what 
has been refused to be revealed. With Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue and Stenger’s Whitehead, the 
problem of the prodrome moves away from the individual and toward the colonial world in 
which she was (and is) buried alive by psycurity’s his-tory. 
 
Abyss 
Like many Indians and Mexicans, I did not deem my psychic experiences real. I denied 
their occurrences and let my inner senses atrophy. I allowed white rationality to tell me 
that the existence of the “other world” was mere pagan superstition. I accepted their 
reality, the “official” reality of the rational, reasoning mode which is connected with 
external reality, the upper world, and is considered the most developed consciousness – 
the consciousness of duality. 
The other mode of consciousness facilitates images from the soul and the 
unconscious through dreams and the imagination. Its work is labeled as “fiction”, make-
believe, wish-fulfillment. White anthropologists claim that Indians have “primitive” and 
therefore deficient minds, that we cannot think in the higher mode of consciousness – 
rationality. They are fascinated by what they call the “magical” mind, the “savage” mind, 
the participation mystique of the mind that says the world of the imagination – the world 
of the soul – and of the spirit is just as real as physical reality. In trying to become 
“objective”, Western culture made “objects” of things and people when it distanced itself 
from them, thereby losing “touch” with them. This dichotomy is the root of all violence. 
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Not only was the brain split into two functions, but so was reality. (p. 58-9, 
Anzaldúa, 1987, her emphasis)  
  
Here, Anzaldúa writes of a violence moving through ‘participation mystique’, a concept first put 
forth by anthropologist Lucien Levy-Bruhl in his 1910 book, How Natives Think. Republished 
by Princeton University Press in 1985, Levy-Bruhl describes two distinctive elements of 
‘primitive’ (as compared to ‘modern’) thinking. First, that it is ‘mystical’, that all phenomena are 
one with each other and thus that human beings are inextricably participating with the world. 
And second, that it is ‘prelogical’, that things are able to simultaneously be both themselves and 
something else – a thinking that, in his words, “does not bind itself down, as our thought does, to 
avoiding contradictions” (p. 78). Levy-Bruhl understood this participation mystique to be a 
consequence of incorrect representations shaping people’s conceptions and perceptions of the 
world and thus coming between them and reality, creating outright false beliefs, delusional 
experiences, and irrationality. In contrast, modern representations shape only people’s 
conceptions and not their perceptions, thereby conveying reality. This is because, over time, 
these representations have ‘managed to’ filter out the emotionality that otherwise colors thinking, 
evolving a more rational mind (Segal, 2007).  
Robert Segal (2007) documents how Carl Jung used Levy-Bruhl’s writing on the 
participation mystique as data to develop his own ideas about the psyche. While carrying forth 
the mystical elements, Jung left behind the prelogical in favor of psychologizing people’s 
experiences. Participation mystique came to be seen as one’s unconscious projecting itself onto 
the world, making us feel (but not really be) connected. This redirection toward the individual 
lurks in the abovementioned development of the SIPS, based as it is on people having perceptual 
disturbances in their bodily boundaries and causal attributions. Moreover, given that these 
disturbances are testifying to a wrong psyche or a wrong representation (prodromal experiences 
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inside “the general Western cultural tradition” suggest potential psychopathology whilst 
prodromal experiences outside of this context suggest some kind of ‘non-Western’ cultural 
belief), the SIPS also sets up a dynamic that maps the contours of modern versus primitive 
thinking established through the participation mystique. This suggests that the prodromal 
movement sanctions an enduring colonial encounter; one that positions ‘the West’ as having 
come beyond ‘the non-West’ to directly access the truth of the world. Indeed to experience 
anything other than this truth is to potentially be psychotic.  
Further, such ‘primitive thinking’ confers a psychology to nature that needs to be 
overcome “in order to dominate her”:  
As we know, great minds have wrestled with the problem whether it is the glorious sun 
that illuminates the world, or the sunlike human eye. Archaic man believes it to be the 
sun, and civilized man believes it to be the eye… He must de-psychize nature in order to 
dominate her; and in order to see his world objectively he must take back all his archaic 
projections. (Jung, 1970, para. 135)  
 
Protecting the borders of a manmade world, Jung (1970) writes of how becoming a “great mind” 
requires that one does not see the world as an extension of their selves. Instead, “Progress comes 
from seeing the world as it is. The external world is really natural rather than supernatural, 
impersonal rather than personal. Science properly replaces myth and religion as the explanation 
of the world. There is no turning back” (Segal, 2007, p. 649, my emphasis). Sylvia Wynter 
(2003) has documented how the present-day coloniality of power rests on these sorts of 
beginnings, which illustrate “the first gradual de-supernaturalizing of our modes of being 
human” (p. 264); one that required “the systematic stigmatization of the Earth in terms of it 
being made of a ‘vile and base matter’”, “at the center of the universe as its dregs” (p. 367). 
Indeed, for Trinh Minh-ha (1989), the “supposedly universal tension between Nature and Culture 
is, in reality, a non-universal human dis-ease” (p. 67, her emphasis); any supposed conflict 
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comes from a patriarchal and fearful framing of them as opposite to (rather than different from) 
one another, exiling the creative potential of matter (Trinh, 1989), preparing the ground for 
capitalist expansion (Federici, 2014). These readings illustrate how we – those of us from a 
colonial lineage – “presume to be the ones who have accepted the hard truth that we are alone in 
a mute, blind, yet knowable world- one that it is our task to appropriate” (Stengers, 2012, p. 1). 
Causing a desire-to-know, a “positivist yearning for transparency with respect to reality” (Trinh, 
1989, p. 64), that blocks, refuses, ignores other worlds. A sort of (En)light(ened) pollution that 
stops us from seeing the stars.  
This “scientific conquering ‘view of the world’” is what Stengers (2012) affiliates with a 
‘Science’ that, “when taken in the singular and with a big S, may indeed be described as a 
general conquest bent on translating everything that exists into objective, rational knowledge” (p. 
2). It is this Science that, as Anzaldúa writes above, “made ‘objects’ of things and people when it 
distanced itself from them, thereby losing ‘touch’ with them”. Connecting this sort of 
objectification to the exile of the participation mystique “that says the world of the imagination – 
the world of the soul – and of the spirit is just as real as physical reality”, Anzaldúa’s description 
of how colonization splits reality into two depicts, predicts, politicizes the splitting of 
imagination and reality – the bifurcating of nature – carried out by the SIPS. Showing us that 
instruments of psycuritized inquiry perhaps say more about colonization than the madness we 
think they are investigating. For example, wafting through my own Pākehā heritage at the same 
time that Levy-Bruhl was making his observations is the 1907 New Zealand Tohunga 
Suppression Act (TSA) to criminalize tohunga – Indigenous healers rooted in relational 
ontologies that do not separate the world of matter from the world of spirit (Stewart-Harawira, 
2005). Despite a liberal ruse of protecting Māori wellbeing, popular and judicial reports at the 
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time made the colonial intentions of the TSA explicit: to dismember the mobilizing capacities of 
tohunga, often leaders in their communities and wielding substantive social and spiritual power 
(Voyce, 1989).  
Of particular threat were the actions of Rua Kenana – a Tūhoe tohunga foretelling a gift 
of four million pounds from King Edward VII for Māori to buy back stolen land, thereby 
foretelling the millennial return of Indigenous sovereignty. British settlers feared a land war; 
using English witch-hunting laws and the support of Māori elite who had been ‘educated’ 
through the colonial system, the TSA was passed to “check the trouble” (Voyce, 1989). Of 
particular note, however, is that what was threatening to colonial rule was not what emancipated 
future Kenana was foretelling (within the settler worldview, this was patently impossible) so 
much as that he was foretelling one. It was the feeling of potential emancipation, imagining that 
another world was possible, to which the TSA was targeted. State-sanctioned cosmological 
violence was part of a war on imagination necessary for colonization. And, as Tūhoe 
psychologist Wiremu Woodard (2014) has documented, this violence continues to operate in 
contemporary mental health services. Indeed, critical psychologists from around the world name 
the destruction of imagination as central to the colonization of the psyche and the land, such that 
imagining itself has become a present-day decolonial praxis (e.g., Segalo, Manoff, & Fine, 2015; 
Martin-Baro, 1994). 
The participation mystique and the TSA suggest that this praxis – imagining – may be 
about reclaiming an otherworldly correspondence. If so, then this requires “smelling the smoke 
in our nostrils…” (Stengers, 2012, p. 6).  Hearing neo-pagan activist, Starhawk, Stengers is 
referring here to the smoke coming from the wall that was and is built between truth and illusion, 
that billows in the parentheses – the (true) and (false) at the end of each item in the Perceptual 
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Aberration and Magical Ideation scales – telling us the ‘right’ answer. A divide that, Stengers 
continues, is filled with fears that we might, and thus moral imperatives that we shall not, 
‘regress’ to soft, illusory beliefs shamefully lying far from the hard truth of progress – for the 
colonizer-Scientist is “he who knows how to distinguish the real from the false…” (Trinh, 1989, 
p. 56, her emphasis). Such “setting of an absolute boundary, a clear dividing line, a geometry of 
exclusion that positions the self on one side, and the other – the not-self – on the other side” 
exemplifies a colonial logic (Barad, 2014, p. 169), that abyss carved into the stranger’s face that 
Anzaldúa (1987) saw in the black, obsidian mirror of the Nahuas. 
The gaping mouth slit heart from mind. Between the two eyes in her head, the tongueless 
magical eye and the loquacious rational eye, was la rajadura, the abyss that no bridge 
could span. Separated, they could not visit each other and each was too far away to hear 
what the other was saying. Silence rose like a river and could not be held back. It flooded 
and drowned everything. (p. 66-7) 
 
A drowning silence that echoes in the experience of “‘solitary consciousness,’ and its 
mute, disenchanted world”, that, as per Stengers (2011), “the bifurcation of nature turned into the 
only rational starting point for inquiry” (p. 353). Prodrome-the-borderland suggests that this 
colonial interference may not have only displaced our participation with the world, but diffracted 
it too – producing not the same elsewhere, so much as something else (Barad, 2007). Living in 
the borderland, Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue whispers these forgotten relations in our ears. Yet, heard in 
a neocolonial security state awash with fear, her murmurs become cryptic, shameful, 
overwhelming, growing as paranoia like a “crystal in a hypersaturated solution” (Sedgwick, 
2003). Standing at the gates of psycurity, they are only allowed entry to reality when stamped by 
the SIPS with ‘psychotic disorder’; detained in our individualized psyches, blocked at the border, 
“That writhing serpent movement, the very movement of life, swifter than lightening, frozen” 
(Anzaldúa, 1987, p. 42). Within the prodromal movement our imagination encounters not just 
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what Miranda Fricker (2008) calls an ‘epistemic injustice’, but some sort of ontologic one too – 
repeating an obliteration central to the colonial project (Bhaba, 2004). 
Yet again, the prodrome is potentially more than this. For Stengers (2012), everything 
requires a specific milieu in order for it to exist and, on the flipside, not everything may accept 
the milieu that is offered to it. Experiences that might be explained (away) as “superstition, 
belief, or symbolic efficacy” – such as those checked by psycurity through the prodromal 
movement – might be better seen as requiring a milieu that “does not answer to scientific 
demands” (p. 3). Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue shows us that our questioning of the prodrome could 
move towards, “kicking a hole out of the old boundaries of the self and slipping under or over, 
dragging the old skin along, stumbling over it” (p. 71). This strange goddess suggests that there 
is something else right here, right now; that “slightly alien guest” within paranoia’s own 
(linguistic) ancestry (Miller, 1977). 
 
Beside-the-mind 
I see oposicion e insurrection. I see the crack growing on the rock. I see the fine frenzy 
building. I see the heat of anger or rebellion or hope split open that rock, releasing la 
Coatlicue. And someone in me takes matters into our own hands, and eventually, takes 
dominion over serpents – over my body, my sexual activity, my soul, my mind, my 
weaknesses and strengths. Mine. Ours. Not the heterosexual white man’s or the colored 
man’s or the state’s or the culture’s or the religion’s or the parents’ – just ours, mine. 
And suddenly I feel everything rushing to a center, a nucleus. All the lost pieces of 
myself come flying from the deserts and the mountains and the valleys, magnetized 
toward that center. Completa. 
Something pulsates in my body, a luminous thin thing that grows thicker every 
day. Its presence never leaves me. I am never alone. That which abides: my vigilance, my 
thousand sleepless serpent eyes blinking in the night, forever open. And I am not afraid. 
(p. 73) 
 
Choosing not to take the line offered by the SIPS, plunging vertically through the border between 
imagination and reality, is not anti-empiricism, quite the opposite: it calls for a more extreme 
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kind. It means refusing to privilege mechanisms that are “otherwise used to judge or measure 
according to a norm, differentiating between experiences whose objects are legitimate or 
illusory” (Stengers, 2011, p. 234). Withholding eliminative judgment, instruments like the SIPS 
can be invited instead to identify the very experiences that will be, as Anzaldúa (1987) writes in 
her poetry, “the green shoot that cracks the rock” (p. 105). Far from the bifurcation of nature, it is 
to this splitting – of Psychology’s episteme – that we might attend. Cradled in the arms of 
Coatlicue, the prodrome points to the vitality and the milieu of paranoia, changing the shape of 
this problem from cliff-edge to borderland, from individual to abyss. An unsettling, reparative 
reading that suggests existing prodromal tools may not necessarily “bring in psychological 
individualism through the back door” (Blackman et al., 2008, p. 10). Indeed that with certain 
interlocutors they may even hold a decolonial potential to re-turn paranoia’s etymological roots. 
Aimee Carillo Rowe and Eve Tuck (2016) define decolonial projects as “push[ing] back 
against the linearity of history and the future, against teleological narratives of human 
development, and argu[ing] for renderings of time and place which exceed coloniality and 
conquest” (p. 2). This definition synchs with Sedgwick’s (2003) call for reparative alongside 
paranoid readings, which emerged out of her broader project to explore how, unlike ‘beneath’ 
and ‘beyond’, beside invites critical scholars to resist thinking in terms of origin and telos. 
Instead, beside permits a “spacious agnosticism” around linear logics that may otherwise enforce 
dualist, colonial thinking, thereby allowing for a wide range of relations, of “desiring, 
identifying, representing, repelling, paralleling, differentiating, rivaling, leaning, twisting, 
mimicking, withdrawing, attracting, aggressing, warping, and other relations” (p. 8). To read 
paranoia as beside-the-mind, then, is not to simply replace one think-net with another, capturing 
thought in abstractions. To the contrary, as a kind of “spatial confrontation” between concepts – 
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European and non-European, non-human and human, reparative and paranoid, imagination and 
real – it potentially overcomes the limits of territorial thinking (Mignolo, 2012).  
Speaking from dichotomies, beside-the-mind calls for attunement, for seeing threshold 
phenomenon as capacities that shape-shift across different situations – perhaps colonizing, 
perhaps decolonizing, perhaps something else. In doing so it not only takes us to the abyss, to 
paranoia’s space of encounter and the objects and operations that make this up, joining with 
Harper and Cromby’s (2009) attention to distressing contexts; it takes us to the borderland, to 
paranoia’s unruliness, encouraging an ethological approach. In some ways similar to Brown and 
Stenner’s (2009) suggestion that we watch and learn how the whale-cum-psyche behaves in 
different circumstances, an ethological approach also understands that what we follow is not 
indifferent to how we engage with it, indeed that it may actively prevent us from getting a hold 
(Pignarre & Stengers, 2011). Beside-the-mind takes the whale’s agency into account, too. Itself 
slippery, perhaps enacting and obliging the creative and reflexive foundationalism put forth by 
Brown and Stenner (2009), it further assumes the indifference of Trinh (1989) to colonial 
theorizing, “of piercing, as he often claims, through the sediments of psychological and 
epistemological ‘depths’. I may stubbornly turn around a foreign thing or turn it around to play 
with it, but I respect its realm of opaqueness” (p. 48). Beside-the-mind obliges a praxis of 
humility and trial-and-error, an accountable uncertainty that is open to surprises, “my thousand 
sleepless serpent eyes blinking in the night, forever open”.  
Indeed, perhaps most of all, beside-the-mind suggests that paranoia may be looking back 
at Psychology. Far from hunting or even just following this experience, then, we might pursue an 
apprenticeship with it, “creating new means of grasping a situation, leading to the production of 
new ways of acting, of connecting, of being efficacious…” (Pignarre & Stengers, 2011, p. 77). 
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And this may include the direction of our attention to the ‘supernatural’ otherwise grabbed by the 
tight grip of routine practice, derealized in the name of Psychology’s own transcendent truth. For 
Pignarre and Stengers (2011), the non-integration of ‘soul’ into scientific vocabulary – despite 
the psykhe staring Psychology in the face, and the resonance of spiritual readings for paranoid 
people (May, 2016) – is indicative of practitioners being trapped in shrunken categories of 
thought. They urge us to turn toward knowledges that we have disqualified. For them, and for 
Nathan (1999), this includes following service-users’ example of not opposing two worlds. That 
is, people who do not experience threshold phenomena as merely belief, but who are learning 
how to live in-between. The UK Paranoia Network, for example, has been experimenting with 
making spaces that welcome diverse readings of paranoia, attend to the local hold that these 
experiences have on a person, and listen to what they may tell us about the contemporary 
landscape. As Rufus May (2016) writes:  
If we are able to achieve some detachment from our beliefs in the knowledge they are just 
one way of seeing the world, we become more aware that ‘the map’ (i.e. our beliefs) is 
not the territory; and that different maps tell us about different aspects of the territory. 
(n.p.) 
 
More broadly, by naming beside-the-mind, I am trying to show that paranoia does not 
have to choke us, trying to protect us – whether colonized, colonizer, or both11 – against another 
operation of colonialist capture. That while paranoia may “make sense” within contemporary 
conditions it does not have to be “the normal state of affairs” (Frosh, 2016). To the contrary, as 
beside-the-mind paranoia is reclaimed as a capacity, and thus perhaps also as a potential medium 
of political or cultural struggle. Unlike the paranoia outlined by Sedgwick (2003), beside-the-
mind entices a mystified view of systemic oppressions, opening a wide range of possibilities, 
requiring an endlessly iterative and collective participation. So often used to weaken the potency 
of protest (“You’re just being paranoid!”) yet, with Anzaldúa’s Coatlicue, we are reminded that 
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this sense is telling us that something else lies nearby. And, whispering from the fecund cave of 
our imagination, beside-the-mind includes that magic(al ideation) in the air, encouraging us to 
“perceive and accept what we know to be impossible” (Stengers, 2012, p. 8). Within poisoned 
times of swelling white supremacy, where another world slips in and out of being possible, this 
desire-to-know – “released by the heat of anger, rebellion, hope” – seems so incredibly 
important. Beside-the-mind allows paranoia to be a little green snake, hissing both cause and 
cure, soliciting a different kind of response-ability for Psychology within the present political 
moment: no longer, What is the matter with paranoia? What should we do about it?, so much as 
What is the matter of paranoia? What else could it do?  
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Notes 
1. I realize that in using this “we” I am further incising categories of “the colonizers” and “the 
colonized”. However, given that forgetting is a necessary step in colonization (Cesaire, 1955), I 
choose to do so in order to both provoke a re-membering for those readers who share my settler 
legacy and respect Tuck and Yang’s (2012) call to avoid “moves to innocence” within 
commitments to decolonization.  
2. To be clear, I am not using decolonization as a metaphor here (Tuck and Yang, 2012). I see 
threshold phenomena and taking an affective turn in Psychology as having the potential to 
directly respond to the epistemic, ontological, and cosmological violence that came with the 
disruption of Indigeneous relationships to land.  
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3. Describing herself as “a third world lesbian feminist with Marxist and mystic leanings”, 
Anzaldúa preferred to position herself on thresholds and to foreground her spirit-inflected 
politics and texts (Keating, 2009). While typically seen as rich and relevant for critical race and 
queer studies, Anzaldúa’s writing has been somewhat overlooked in terms of its potential 
contribution to disability studies, even though her theorizing was very much informed by her 
own disability (McMaster, 2005; Keating, 2009). I chose her as my interlocutor because her 
theory is rich and relevant in content and in form for Psychology, particularly with regard to 
threshold phenomena. Moreover, she embodies the efficacy of both the “border thinking” that I 
attempt to do in this essay (Mignolo, 2012), and the “mystified approach” that I come to argue 
for towards its end (Lara, 2005).  
4. Based on this trajectory of research, Chapman and Chapman received the 1997 American 
Psychological Association (APA) Award for Distinguished Scientific Applications of 
Psychology; Patrick McGorry, who helped to establish the first prodromal clinic in 1994, 
received Australian of the Year Award in 2010 for his contribution to youth mental health. 
5. Unlike her writing on la mestiza consciousness, Anzaldúa’s writing on Coatlicue is rarely 
excerpted or examined yet “these issues were crucial to Anzaldúa herself and represent some of 
the most innovative, visionary dimensions of her work” (Keating, 2009, p. 5). Anzaldúa 
explicitly wrote how her words did not ‘belong’ to her; that once they came though her body and 
onto the page they were there for people to pick up and use, to think and fly with. At the same 
time with regard to Indigeneous spiritualities, while “some things are worth borrowing”, we 
“often misuse what we’ve borrowed by using it out of context” and thus “need to scrutinize the 
purpose and accountability for one’s ‘borrowing’” (Anzaldúa, 2003, p. 289). In this essay I risk 
isolating Coatlicue, disconnecting her from Mexica culture and land, forcing her into a Western 
context – effectively treating her, as Anzaldúa (2003) continues, in a manner akin to how 
colonial museums exhibit Indigenous objects. By committing to decolonial content and politics 
and experimenting with an unsettling form and practice, I hope that I have been able to host 
Coatlicue in a respectful way (Miller, 1977; Trinh, 1989). Nonetheless I am walking a dangerous 
line of ‘inclusion’. This footnote, then, is to witness and enter – without resolving/dissolving – 
the complexity of this project. Instead, I offer this as an experiment for Psychology and affect 
studies in the possibilities of opening subjectivity to “new theoretical horizons” (Blackman et al., 
2008) while commiting to decolonization by uprooting the colonizing space in which our 
intellectual ancestors came to act like they knew better, evoking Minh-ha’s (1989) cry: “In sight 
of every reader-by, let him run naked” (p. 47). Following Stengers (2012), this reveal includes 
taking care to not verify Science’s authority – by, for example, feeling authorized to write about 
Indigenous, colonized knowledges and experiences; to rationalize, rescue, re-colonize Coatlicue, 
‘welcoming’ her into the European canon – but rather to excavate that which “served to justify 
colonization and the divide across which some felt free to study and categorize others” (p. 1).  
6. I am reminded here of an article in the Psychiatric Times on November 14th, 2014, about Dr 
John Mack, a Harvard Professor who came to accept that his patients’ reports of alien abductions 
were accurate recounts of real events, inciting “decidedly negative reactions” from his colleagues 
for “going native”. 
7. From Adventure of Ideas (New York: Free Press, 1967) 
8. From Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, 1979) 
9. From Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1967) 
10. From Process and Reality (New York: Free Press, 1979) 
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11. While Sandoval (2006) suggests that Coatlicue can be useful for working with Latinas and 
Chicanas, I am suggesting that this goddess invites an ethical praxis that Western psychological 
and political practices can learn from.  
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